The development of graphene enterprises can play an important role in promoting the graphene and other industries, further contributing to the operation of society. Cooperative ambidextrous innovation is an important strategy for graphene manufacturer and graphene application enterprises. To explore the coordination mechanism of cooperative ambidextrous innovation of graphene enterprises, this paper constructs the evolutionary game model between graphene manufacturer and downstream application enterprises. We analyze the stability of evolution strategies and influential factors in interfirm coordination of cooperative ambidextrous innovation. Furthermore, the paper builds a numerical model to simulate the probabilistic evolution trend and dynamic evolution process among different types of cooperative ambidextrous innovation of graphene enterprises. The results also show that for each type, increasing excess revenue and penalty costs have positive driving effects on the coordination behavior of cooperative ambidextrous innovation of the graphene manufacturer and application enterprises. Only by controlling the allocation coefficient of excess revenue and the risk-taking coefficient in the reasonable range can significant roles be achieved to the greatest favorable extent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the discovery of graphene, it has received considerable attention from scholars, and related governmental policies have been developed [1] - [3] . Graphene is the new and attractive material with its remarkable characteristics of thinness, lightness and hardness. Graphene not only provides enormous economic benefits but also plays a significant role in green development in society. Graphene manufacturer and application enterprises are two important components of the industrial chain and have close upstream and downstream links. But most of the participants are small and medium-sized enterprises with limited resources. How can these related graphene enterprises better unify to achieve development under the fourth industrial revolution and The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Roberto Sacile. perfect the development of the graphene industrial chain? Cooperative ambidextrous innovation is one efficient and significant strategy. It includes that, respectively, cooperative exploitive innovation means that graphene manufacturer and application enterprises cooperate to upgrade and improve their existing technologies [4] , [5] . Cooperative explorative innovation is a new kind of innovation that differs from the original technological track through cooperation. In addition, some graphene enterprises may choose these two kinds of innovations concurrently because of their strength, which is called cooperative parallel ambidextrous innovation [6] . Only the coordinated development of graphene manufacturer and application enterprises can better achieve cooperative ambidextrous innovation. The coordination mechanism of cooperative ambidextrous innovation is to explore whether the interaction behavior of the two main bodies of graphene manufacturer and application enterprises VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ goes smoothly when carrying out cooperative ambidextrous innovation [7] , [8] . Cooperative ambidextrous innovation can not only improve their competitiveness but also to save a lot of resources. It plays an important role in the survival and further development of graphene enterprises. The coordination mechanism of active cooperation is an important factor to measure the success of cooperative ambidextrous innovation. When graphene manufacturer and application enterprises cooperate through strong interactions and coordination, it not only improves the innovation performance of graphene enterprises but also promotes the linkage degree of the whole graphene industry chain. Therefore, the coordination issues and affected factors of cooperative ambidextrous innovation between graphene manufacturer and application enterprises is of great significance for further study. The available studies on graphene mostly focus on the technological production or how to apply it. Different methods for making graphene according to its characterization have been extensively researched [9] . Graphene, in its pure or derivative form, can be used to generate graphene porous membranes to solve problems in the gas and oil industries [10] . There are also in-depth studies on its definition and how to classify graphene [11] . UK graphene firms pay more attention to science-based information, but firms from China are more likely to search cooperation for development [12] . Some scholars also propose that governance mechanisms, social capital, and geographic distance are important factors affecting cooperative innovation [13] , [14] . Simultaneously, they also evaluate the performance and efficiency of cooperative innovation and the operation effect of partners, or the combination of different cooperative innovation modes [15] , [16] . Additionally, through cross-case research, innovation networks are a focus of research centers [17] . Scholars have studied the influential factors of ambidextrous innovation extensively [18] , [19] . The collaborative ties play the important role in promoting the development of ambidextrous innovation, technological and administrative change have a U-shaped impact on ambidextrous innovation [20] , [21] . Scholars have explored ambidextrous research from the perspective of managerial attention and knowledge management [22] , [23] . From different perspectives, the coordinating paths of explorative innovation and exploitive innovation are proposed, including the realization of the separation coexistence according to the time sequence, or of the coexistence of exploration and exploitation in different departments in time, or through ambidextrous leadership [24] , [25] . Scholars also explain two kinds of innovations through the case study [26] .
Generally, it is agreed that the graphene industry should strengthen the cooperation of enterprises. However, research on cooperative ambidextrous innovation among enterprises in the graphene industry is limited. Research on cooperative and ambidextrous innovation explores the influential factors and partner selection, there is a lack of research on coordination mechanism. Therefore, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model between graphene manufacturer and application enterprises according to the reality, ambidextrous innovation theory, synergetic and evolutionary economics theory, analyzes the dynamic process seeking optimal strategies [27] - [29] . The factors influencing coordination behavior of cooperative ambidextrous innovation are further explored. Then the paper uses a numerical simulation to simulate evolutionary behavior more appropriately, countermeasures and suggestions are also proposed to achieve further development. This paper considers the problem of multiple main bodies from the graphene industry and dynamically explains the evolution characteristics of coordination behavior between graphene manufacturer and application enterprises. It simulates the evolution of system and its influential factors in three situations, including cooperative explorative innovation, cooperative exploitive innovation and cooperative parallel ambidextrous innovation. Graphene will be an important material for future development. Results and conclusions not only provide relevant guidance and reference for the development of graphene manufacturer and application enterprises, but also expand the related research in the field of ambidextrous innovation and graphene.
II. CONSTRUCTION OF EVOLUTIONARY GAME MODEL
This research belongs to multiagent game problems. Under the premise of limited rationality, both graphene manufacturer and application enterprises are prone to speculate, conflict and other acts during the cooperation. It is difficult to find the optimal strategy for one time, but the graphene enterprises continue to adjust and choose the optimal strategy [30]- [32] . This is a dynamic evolutionary process in accordance with the characteristics of the evolutionary game. Thus, the evolutionary game method is selected as the research method.
Assumption 1: The main bodies of this study are divided into graphene manufacturer enterprises E GM and application enterprises E GA . Strategic choices include cooperative ambidextrous innovation continuously or midway betrayal and withdrawal. If the enterprises choose continuous cooperative ambidextrous innovation, it will make every effort to promote coordination and cooperation between the two sides to continue sharing risks and profits. If it chooses to betray and quit in the middle stage, it will stop providing knowledge or technical support to the other side, the enterprise will no longer acquire the corresponding benefits, the coordination behavior is terminated. The probability that the graphene manufacturer and application enterprise choose to continue cooperative ambidextrous innovation is x and y, and the probability of choosing to betray and quit halfway is (1 − x) and (1 − y), and they are all functions of time.
Assumption 2: The normal income of graphene manufacturer and application enterprises are W E , W F and input cost is γ C. αβV is the additional income and δεQ is the loss of market risk, among them, γ , α, δ represent the allocation coefficient between them, and γ , α, δ ∈ [0, 1]. β and ε represent different types of cooperative ambidextrous innovation in the short or long term. Cooperative exploitive innovation is always faced with the lowest level of risk, whereas cooperative parallel ambidextrous innovation will face a weaker degree risk. Cooperative explorative innovation will face a higher level of risk and the lower level of additional revenue. cooperative exploitive innovation will acquire the middle level of additional revenue. Cooperative parallel ambidextrous innovation will achieve the higher level of additional benefits. Concomitantly, any subject who chooses to betray and withdraw needs to pay compensation L to the other party, the betrayal benefits due to the knowledge spillover of each side is recorded as P E , P F [33] .
Based on assumptions and evolutionary game theory, the game payment matrix of coordination behavior of cooperative ambidextrous innovation between graphene manufacturer and application enterprises is obtained as shown in Table 1 [34] , [35] .
If graphene manufacturer enterprises choose cooperative ambidextrous innovation continuously strategy, the benefits are as follows:
If the enterprises choose the exit strategy of betrayal and withdrawal in the process, the benefits are shown as follows:
Thus, the average return of graphene manufacturer enterprises is:Ū
The replication dynamic equation of cooperative ambidextrous innovation of graphene manufacturer enterprises is as follows:
Similarly, for graphene application enterprises, the benefits of choosing the continuous cooperative ambidextrous innovation strategy and betrayal strategy are shown respectively as follows: 
The replication dynamic equation of graphene application enterprises is:
III. ANALYSIS OF THE EVOLUTIONARY PATH, INFLUENTIAL FACTORS A. EVOLUTIONARY PATH ANALYSIS OF THE STABILITY STRATEGY
The proportion of graphene manufacturer enterprises adopting continuous cooperative ambidextrous innovation is stable when
The second derivative is obtained as follows:
If f (x * ) = 0, f (x * ) < 0, x * is the evolutionary stabilization strategy. Thus, the following situations are discussed and the evolution of possibility of cooperation of graphene manufacturer enterprises is shown in Fig. 1 . When y = y * , all values of x are stable. When y < y * , x * = 0 indicates the evolutionary stabilization strategy. When the probability of continuous cooperative ambidextrous innovation is lower than y * , graphene manufacturer enterprises will choose to continue cooperation with the smaller probability and eventually choose to betray and withdraw. When y > y * , x * = 1 corresponds to the evolutionary stabilization strategy. Under this circumstance, the willingness of graphene manufacturer enterprises to choose cooperation will continue to increase, and they will eventually choose cooperative ambidextrous innovation.
Similarly, the second derivative of graphene application enterprises is obtained as follows:
If h(y * ) = 0, h (y * ) < 0 is satisfied, and x * is also an evolutionary stabilization strategy. The evolutionary phase diagrams are shown as follows: 
B. STABILITY ANALYSIS OF THE EVOLUTIONARY GAME MODEL
The local equilibrium points constitute the boundary of evolutionary game solution for cooperative ambidextrous innovation between graphene manufacturer enterprises and graphene application enterprises. The matrix Jocobi of the system is obtained by computing the replication dynamic equation. The determinant Det(J) and trace Tr(J) of the matrix are obtained by further calculation, respectively:
The stability of each local equilibrium point is analyzed based on the determinant and trace of the matrix [36] , [37] . The results are shown in Table 2 .
According to the analysis of the replication dynamics and stability, the specific dynamic evolutionary process can be determined between graphene manufacturer and application enterprises, as shown in Fig. 3 . When the initial state of coordination behavior of cooperative ambidextrous innovation is located in the OKRI region, the behavior will finally converge to the point O. Graphene manufacturer enterprises and application enterprises will choose the betrayal exit strategy. When the initial state point is located in the region RIJK , the behavior will finally converge to point J , cooperative ambidextrous innovation will continue. 
C. ANALYSIS OF INFLUENTIAL FACTORS
The evolutionary stable path and saddle point location are affected by many factors, and the evolution results will be determined by saddle point location. The measure S O and S J denote the regional area OKRI and RIJK . Thus, the analysis of the factors affecting the continuous cooperative ambidextrous innovation can be transformed into the analysis of factors affecting S O .
The paper calculates the first derivative of the influential factor through S O . It shows that with more additional benefits obtained, graphene manufacturer and application enterprises are more likely to choose to continue to cooperate with each other as follows:
Equation (14) shows that the greater market loss due to the risk of cooperative ambidextrous innovation, the greater possibility of choosing the betrayal strategy is. When the loss of market risk exceeds the scope of both sides, the coordination behavior will eventually evolve to the point O.
Equations (15) and (16) show the need to discuss the influence of the excess income distribution coefficient and risk loss coefficient on the probability of strategies. When the results are less than zero, both sides have a higher probability of choosing cooperative ambidextrous innovation. In contrast, the choice of betrayal and withdrawal tends to be greater. The more penalties the two sides pay to persistent enterprises, the more likely they are to choose the strategy of persistent cooperation shown. Increasing penalty costs are beneficial to the cooperative ambidextrous innovation of graphene enterprises.
Equations (18) and (19) show that the higher betrayal benefit, the higher is the probability of the subject choosing to betray. Therefore, graphene enterprises should attempt to protect their own technology and minimize the spillover of knowledge, not only to protect their own interests but also to indirectly reduce the probability of betrayal for the other side.
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS
To improve the reasonableness of the conclusion, the evolutionary game process of cooperative ambidextrous innovation and influential factors are analyzed by the numerical simulation method. The relevant parameters are set according to related references, experts' opinions and reality [38] , [39] . β = 0.22, ε = 0.92 and β = 0.62, ε = 0.82 represent the short-term and long-term situation for cooperative explorative innovation. β = 0.62, ε = 0.52 and β = 0.32, ε = 0.52 indicate cooperative exploitative innovation. β = 0.52, ε = 0.72 and β = 0.92, ε = 0.62 correspond to two terms of cooperative parallel ambidextrous innovation, respectively.
A. PROBABILITY EVOLUTIONARY SIMULATION ANALYSIS OF THE PARTY GAME
The probabilistic evolution between graphene manufacturer and application enterprises in the short-term and long-term are shown in Fig. 4 . The saddle point of cooperative explorative innovation is close to the ideal solution in the short-term stage, whereas in the long run, it is near the point of the nonideal solution. For cooperative exploitive innovation, both sides of the saddle point are close to the non-ideal solution in both long-term and short-term phases, and the convergence speed is faster in the short-term. When the cooperative parallel ambidextrous innovation is conducted, in both short-term and long-term stage, the saddle point is close to the stable point where graphene enterprises choose the exit strategy of betrayal, but the convergence rate is opposite to that of cooperative exploitive innovation.
B. DYNAMIC EVOLUTION PROCESS ANALYSIS OF EVOLUTIONARY AGENT 1) DYNAMIC EVOLUTION ANALYSIS OF GRAPHENE MANUFACTURER ENTERPRISES
In the case of short-term and long-term operations of cooperative explorative innovation, the dynamic evolution process of graphene manufacturer enterprises' choice strategy with time under different probabilities is shown in Fig. 5 . Compared with the short-term of cooperative explorative innovation, the long-term explorative tendencies evolve faster to the stable state of cooperation, whereas the evolution of betrayal withdrawal is relatively slow. In the case of the short-term operation of the cooperative explorative innovation y * = 0.545. Assume y = 0.9 > y * , the probability of graphene manufacturer enterprises choosing cooperative explorative innovation is greater than 0.4, with a higher probability, the system more VOLUME 7, 2019 rapidly evolves to the ideal stable point. However, when the probability is less than 0.4, graphene manufacturer enterprises finally choose the betrayal exit strategy. When the partner enterprise chooses a smaller probability like y = 0.4 < y * , the smaller the probability the graphene manufacturer enterprise chooses cooperative explorative innovation, and finally choose to betray and withdraw. In the long-term stage y * = 0.310, when graphene application enterprises choose the higher probability of cooperative explorative innovation like y = 0.7, a higher probability that the manufacturer enterprises choose innovation is related to faster evolution of the system to the stable point.
When the graphene application enterprises choose the lower probability of innovation like y = 0.10 < y * , if the probability of manufacturer enterprises choosing ambidextrous innovation is greater than 0.6, the higher the probability of selection, the faster the system evolves to the stable point. In contrast, when the probability is less than 0.5, finally leads to the graphene manufacturer enterprises to betray and quit. In summary, graphene manufacturer enterprises tend to choose betrayal and withdrawal in the short term. But even when the probability of choosing cooperative innovation is too low, graphene manufacturer enterprises still choose cooperative explorative innovation within a certain range in the long term. These findings show that graphene manufacturer enterprises have a stronger willingness to cooperate with graphene application enterprises in explorative innovation in the long-term stage.
In the case of cooperative exploitive innovation, the dynamic evolution process of graphene manufacturer enterprise is shown in Fig. 6 . In the short run period y * = 0.110, when the graphene application enterprise chooses the higher probability of continuous innovation like y = 0.5, the system always converges to a stable state. According to the probability y = 0.1, if x > 0.2, the graphene manufacturer enterprises will always choose the strategy of continuous cooperation. Then, corresponding to x = 0.1, the manufacturer enterprises will finally choose to betray and withdraw.
During the long-term operation period of cooperative exploitive innovation with y * = 0.155, when y = 0.6, the graphene application enterprise chooses continuous innovation with a higher probability, and the graphene manufacturer enterprise also chooses the continuous cooperative exploitive innovation strategy. If the graphene application enterprise chooses exploitive innovation with a low probability y = 0.1, then x > 0.4, the graphene manufacturer enterprises always choose the cooperation strategy and the convergence rate increases with the increase in probability. When x < 0.3, the graphene manufacturer enterprises begin to choose the betrayal exit strategy. This result shows that for graphene manufacturer enterprises, regardless of the long-term or short-term stage, the willingness to cooperate is strong.
The evolution process of graphene manufacturer enterprises at different probability levels of cooperative parallel ambidextrous innovation are shown in Fig. 7 . In the short-term stage y * = 0.275, when y = 0.7 > y * , the higher the probability of graphene manufacturer enterprises choosing innovation, the faster the system evolves to a stable point. Additionally, corresponding to y = 0.1 < y * , when x > 0.5, the manufacturer enterprises still choose the continuous cooperation strategy. However, when x < 0.4, the manufacturer enterprises begin to choose the betrayal exit strategy. Under the long-term operation of cooperative parallel innovation y * = 0.140, assuming that y = 0.5 > y * , the higher the probability of graphene manufacturer enterprises choosing innovation, the faster the system evolves to the stable point. When the probability of the application enterprise choosing innovation is small and y = 0.1 < y * , if the probability of manufacturer enterprises is greater than 0.4, the graphene manufacturer enterprises will still choose the cooperative parallel ambidextrous innovation strategy. When the probability is less than 0.3, the enterprises begin to choose the midway betrayal strategy. The smaller the probability of cooperative parallel ambidextrous innovation, the faster the system evolves. Graphene manufacturer enterprises also have a strong willingness to continue cooperative parallel ambidextrous innovation with application enterprises.
2) DYNAMIC EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF THE GRAPHENE APPLICATION ENTERPRISES
In the short and long term of cooperative explorative innovation, the evolutions of graphene application enterprises are shown in Fig. 8 . In the short-term period x * = 0.851, when the manufacturer enterprise chooses continuous explorative innovation with x = 0.9, when y > 0.5, the system converges at the same time, and the convergence speed increases with the increase in probability. When y < 0.4, the probability of the application enterprise choosing betrayal gradually increases. If the manufacturer enterprises choose with a lower probability x = 0.3, the application enterprises always choose the exit strategy. During the long-term period x * = 0.320, the higher the probability of application enterprises like x = 0.7 > x * , the faster the system evolves to the stable point. Under the situation of x = 0.1 < x * , when y > 0.7 the application enterprises still choose the continuous cooperation strategy, and the convergence rate of the system accelerates with the increase in probability. However, only when y < 0.5 does the cooperative enterprise begin to choose the midway betrayal strategy. Therefore, in the short term, graphene application enterprises still have a strong intention to betray in the middle stage because of the higher risk and more uncertain factors.
In the long term, they will change their strategy to continue cooperative explorative innovation, and their willingness will become stronger because of mutual trust through continuous cooperation in the early stage.
For cooperative exploitive innovation, the evolution is shown in Fig. 9 . In the short-term x * = 0.172, assuming that x = 0.5 > x * , the higher the probability of application enterprises choosing cooperation, the faster the system evolves to the stable point. However, when the manufacturer enterprise chooses x = 0.1 < x * , if y > 0.3, the partner system is still evolving to the ideal stable point; when the probability is less than 0.3, the application enterprise begins to choose the betrayal strategy. During the long-term operation period x * = 0.312, when manufacturer enterprises choose the higher probability of x = 0.6, the convergence speed of the system accelerates with the increasing probability. If x = 0.1, when y > 0.5, the application enterprises still choose the continuous cooperation strategy, and when the y < 0.3, the partner enterprises begin to choose the strategy of betrayal. This phenomenon shows that application enterprises have a strong willingness to engage in exploitive innovation cooperation in both the short term and long term.
The evolutionary processes of cooperative parallel ambidextrous innovation are respectively shown for the short term in Fig. 10 . In the short-term period x * = 0.318, when the probability of manufacturer enterprises choosing innovation is greater x = 0.6, the probability of application enterprises choosing will gradually increase, and the convergence speed will simultaneously accelerate. If x = 0.1 and y > 0.6, the graphene application enterprises still choose the continuous cooperative innovation strategy. However, when y < 0.5, the smaller the probability of the application enterprises choosing continuous innovation strategy, the faster is the convergence rate of the system. In the case of the shortterm operation x * = 0.154, if x = 0.5 > x * , the higher the probability chosen by graphene application enterprises, the faster the system converges to the stable point. However, when the manufacturer enterprise chooses a low probability x = 0.1 < x * , if y > 0.5, the application enterprises will still evolve to the ideal stable point, and when the probability is less than 0.5, they will start to choose betrayal and exit. In the long-term and short-term stages, graphene application enterprises tend to choose cooperative parallel ambidextrous innovation with strong willingness.
C. NUMERICAL SIMULATION ANALYSIS OF INFLUENTIAL FACTORS 1) IMPACT OF ADDITIONAL BENEFITS ON SYSTEM EVOLUTION
When the additional revenue changes, the impacts on the strategic evolution of graphene manufacturer and graphene application enterprises in different situations are shown in Fig. 11 . In the short-term stage of cooperative explorative innovation and exploitive innovation, when V = 15, the system converged to the non-ideal solution at that time, and graphene manufacturer and partner enterprises would simultaneously choose the exit strategy of betrayal in the middle stage. In contrast, when V = 20 and V = 25, graphene manufacturer and graphene application enterprises begin to choose continuous cooperative ambidextrous innovation, and the convergence rate of the system increases with the increase in additional revenue. In the short-term stage of cooperative parallel ambidextrous innovation, graphene manufacturer and graphene application enterprises always choose to continue the cooperative parallel ambidextrous innovation strategy, and the convergence rate of the two to the ideal strategy is also increasing and accelerating with V . In the long-term stage of the three situations, regardless of the value of V , graphene manufacturer and partner enterprises always choose the cooperative explorative, exploitive, parallel ambidextrous innovation strategy. Additionally, with the continuous growth of V , the convergence rate of the two sides of the cooperative ambidextrous innovation strategy also becomes faster, showing that the excess revenue has a positive effect on the three situations of cooperative explorative, exploitive, and parallel ambidextrous innovation, and the driving force is especially obvious in the long-term stage.
2) EFFECT OF THE ADDITIONAL INCOME DISTRIBUTION COEFFICIENT ON SYSTEM EVOLUTION
Under different circumstances, the influence of the excess revenue distribution coefficient on the strategic choice of both sides is shown in Fig. 12 . In the short-term and long-term stages of cooperative explorative innovation, when a = 0.1 and a = 0.3, graphene manufacturer and application enterprises converge simultaneously to choose the stable state of innovation. However, when a = 0.8, graphene manufacturer enterprises and partners chose to betray the exit strategy in the middle stage. In the short-term stage of cooperative exploitive innovation, with the continuous growth of a, the two sides choose to change their decision making from betrayal to continuous cooperative exploitive innovation and then again to betrayal. In the long-term stage, the two sides change from the continuous cooperation strategy to the midway withdrawal strategy. In the short-term stage of cooperative parallel ambidextrous innovation, regardless of the size of the value of a, both graphene manufacturer and application enterprises choose the strategy of continuous cooperation. However, when the value of a changes from 0.1 to 0.3, the convergence rate of both sides to the ideal solution obviously increases, and the convergence rate will be slow during the process of change from 0.3 to 0.8. In the long run, with an increase in a from 0.1 to 0.3, the convergence rate of the two sides' choice of continuous cooperation strategy also shows a state of first increasing and then decreasing, and when a = 0.8, both sides will turn to the choice of the betrayal strategy. The results show that the excess income distribution coefficient needs to be kept within a reasonable range. The appropriate distribution coefficient not only enables graphene manufacturer and application enterprises to approve the benefit distribution scheme but also both sides to gain due benefits from cooperative ambidextrous innovation and to be confident of further cooperation.
3) IMPACT OF MARKET RISK LOSS ON SYSTEM EVOLUTION
When the loss of market risk changes, the evolutionary process of strategic choice between graphene manufacturer and application enterprises is shown in Fig. 13 . In the short-term and long-term stages of cooperative explorative, exploitive, parallel ambidextrous innovation, when Q = 3, both graphene manufacturer and graphene application enterprises converge to the stable state of choosing continuous cooperative innovation. When Q = 5, both sides still choose continuous cooperative innovation at that time, the convergence rate to the ideal stable point clearly slows down. When Q = 7, both sides converge to the stable state of midway betrayal and withdrawal; at this time, both graphene manufacturer and application enterprises will choose to withdraw cooperative ambidextrous innovation. The results show that market risk loss will hinder cooperative ambidextrous innovation in both long-term or short-term phases. Appropriate market risk loss will enable both sides to accept cooperative ambidextrous innovation. The higher the risk loss, the more unfavorable it will be for graphene manufacturer and application enterprises to carry out cooperative ambidextrous innovation.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the premise of bounded rationality, the evolutionary game model of coordination behavior of cooperative ambidextrous innovation is constructed, and the evolutionary path is analyzed. The following conclusions are drawn. With more additional benefits obtained through cooperative ambidextrous innovation, not only can graphene manufacturer and application enterprises obtain considerable benefits through cooperation but the situation is also more conducive to their continued and stable choice of cooperation. Cooperative ambidextrous innovation is prone to risk losses. Both sides should try their best to control this issue within a small range and minimize the losses caused by risks. When the risk losses are too large, the cooperative ambidextrous innovation coordination will be adversely affected, and the graphene enterprises will be unable to bear them and have to choose to betray and quit.
The income allocation coefficient and risk-taking coefficient between them will then both become important factors affecting the coordination behavior of cooperative ambidextrous innovation, but they should be controlled within a reasonable range. The coefficients beyond the range are not conducive to the coordination behaviors, but they will choose to betray and withdraw. The punishment mechanism against the betrayer plays an important role in driving cooperative ambidextrous innovation. The higher the penalty cost, the stronger the driving effect on the coordination behavior of cooperative ambidextrous innovation, and thus, the system evolves with greater ease in the cooperative direction.
Results are beneficial to the development of graphene manufacturer and application enterprises. Based on this study, graphene enterprises can better understand each other's behavioral evolutionary process and the factors influencing their cooperative evolution. Thus, in the actual cooperation, on the one hand, they can be more familiar with what the other side wants to provide, and subsequently determine what should be avoided to better protect themselves, so that this cooperative ambidextrous innovation can proceed smoothly. The better the coordination mechanism is, the smoother the cooperative ambidextrous innovation will be, and graphene enterprises can gain more innovations and profits. Such conclusions provide the path reference for the coordinating cooperation between them. These conclusions not only enrich the research results in the field of cooperative ambidextrous innovation but also provide the theoretical basis for graphene enterprises to formulate policies. Graphene enterprises should not only comprehensively consider the choice of cooperative enterprises based on technology but also the credibility of each other. The construction of graphene enterprise reputation evaluation in the industry should be improved and unnecessary economic losses avoided to the greatest extent.
Concurrently, the graphene manufacturer and application enterprises should strengthen the construction of their own technology and knowledge security system. Based on the protection of their own achievements, they should avoid the leakage of core technologies. It is then necessary to strengthen the awareness of risk prevention and improve the risk response capacity through continuous cooperation to realize the win-win situation. Finally, rationally set the profit distribution coefficient and risk-taking coefficient, it should follow the basic criterion of the multi-risk bearing party with a multi-benefit distribution, and the dynamic distribution coefficient can be established. Considering the different risks faced by both parties at different stages of cooperation, combining cost and investment factors, the distribution of excess profits can not only pay the corresponding profits according to former efforts, but also provide the necessary financial support for the next stage of continued cooperation, and to ensure that the coordination behavior of cooperative ambidextrous innovation between graphene manufacturer and application enterprises proceeds steadily.
